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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
often used in trust instruments, such as support and maintenance, comfort and
well being, or personal needs. 22 It may well be that within these standards such
payments of principal will result in eventual termination of the trust by an
exhaustion of the principal. However, it does not seem that such a restricted
standard can fairly be imported into the trust instrument present here, since to
do so would be restricting the trustee in a manner not contemplated by the
grantor.
There is no question of the trustees acting other than honestly and in good
faith. To the contrary, the dissent felt that utmost regard should be given to
the determination that such a distribution was in the best interests of the beneficiary. In viewing the attendant circumstances, and the favorable tax advantages resulting from a total distribution, both to the income beneficiary and the
remaindermen, the grantors intent would best be served by a termination of
the trust.
The only apparent justification for the decision of the majority, and it is
a strong one, is that the Court, in the interest of giving the fullest weight to
the grantor's intent, will be hesitant in implying a power of termination absent
a clear indication in the trust instrument.2 3 There is little doubt that such a
policy accords with sound judicial reasoning. However, there is a wide area
between narrowly restricted discretion and that which would allow a termination. While the Court's policy in not implying a power of termination upon
such general language as was present here is sound, it is fairly apparent that
the grantor contemplated vesting the trustees with a broader degree of
discretion than that within the standard imposed by the Court. Thus, the
trustee has been placed in a position where he can neither terminate the trust,
nor distribute enough of the principal to alleviate the unfavorable tax situation
present.
CHILD EN VENTRE SA M RE NOT "BENEFICIALLY INTERESTED" IN TRUST

In In re Peabody2 4 Judith Peabody created an irrevocable trust with the
Chase National Bank as trustee. Mrs. Peabody, then childless, directed the
trustee to pay income to her for life, and, upon her death, the corpus was to go
to her surviving issue, and if none be living at that time, to other designated
living persons. Four years later she became pregnant, and wishing to amend
the trust, she obtained the consent of all the living persons designated as
beneficiaries as required by Section 23 of the Personal Property Law. 25 The
22. In re Woolard, supra note 15; In re Morse, supra note 15; In re Clark, 280
N.Y. 155, 19 N..2d 1001 (1939).
23. In re Ahrens, 193 Misc. 844, 84 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd on this ground,
301 N.Y. 701, 95 N.E.2d 53 (1950); In re Bisconti, 306 N.Y. 442, 119 N.E.2d 34 (1952);
In re Mollenhauer's Will, - Misc. 2d -, 158 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
24. In re Peabody, 9 N.Y.2d 541, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959).
25. Upon the written consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a
trust in personal property or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter
created, the creator of such trust may revoke the same, as to the whole,
or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease
in the whole or such part thereof.
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trustee, however, refused to recognize the proposed amendment, contending
that the child en ventre sa tmnre was a "person beneficially interested" under
Section 23, and thus the child's consent was needed to amend. The Court, at
Special Term, held that such consent was not required, and the Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals.
The Court's rationale lay in the trend in recent years to favor the
revocability of trusts. 26 Such a policy would certainly be frustrated if revocation were made to depend upon the consent of persons yet unborn. To hold
otherwise would force a determination as to whether a female settlor was pregnant at the time of amendment, and since no absolute determination can be
made, future litigation is invited.
The Court further considered the intention of the legislature in drafting
Section 23, and pointed out that the legislature has certainly recognized the
possibility of such an occurrence as exists in the present case, and has provided
27
for unborn children where policy so dictates.
It has consistently been held that a child yet unborn is not a "person
beneficially interested" under Section 23.28 These cases, however, referred to
situations where the unborn child was conceived and born after the amendment
was executed. The present case is the first to reach the Court of Appeals where
there existed a child en ventre sa mare at the time the amendment was executed.
One lower court decision has held that the fiction of the law which affixes a
legal personality to an unborn child,2 9 should not be extended to cases of trust
revocation.30
A line must be drawn somewhere and the courts generally do so at the
time of birth. With no accurate method available to ascertain the exact time
of conception, to extend the principle further can only result in chaotic
disturbances to the judicial system.
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Until the recent amendment of the New York Personal Property Law
Section 11,31 the alienation of personal property interests in New York State
could not be restrained for a period greater than that measured by two lives
in being at the time of a gift, the testator's death, or the establishment of a
26. Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. (1951) at 85.
27. Section 26 of the New York Decedent Estate Law provides that where a testator
shall have a child born after the making of a last will, the child, if not mentioned, shall
succeed to the same portion of such parent's real and personal estate as would have
descended to the child had such parent died intestate; Section 83(12) of the New York
Decedent Estate Law gives similar protection to after-born descendants and other distributees of the deceased; so also Section 56 of the Real Property Law provides protection
for posthumous children capable of taking by descent.
28. Smith v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E.2d 72 (1942);
County Trust Co. v. Young, 287 N.Y. 801, 40 N.E.2d 1019 (1942).
29. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
30. In re Wormser's Trust, 15 Misc. 2d 754, 185 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
31. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1958, ch. 152, effective Sept. 1, 1958.

